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Abstract 
At the phenomenal level, consciousness arises in a consistently coherent fashion as a singular, 
unified field of recursive self-awareness (subjectivity) with explicitly orientational characteristics
—that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain. 
Understanding these twin elements of consciousness begins with the recognition that ultimately 
(and most primitively), cognitive systems serve the biological self-regulatory regime in which they 
subsist. The psychological structures supporting self-located subjectivity involve an evolutionary 
elaboration of the two basic elements necessary for extending self-regulation into behavioral 
interaction with the environment: an orientative reference frame which consistently structures 
ongoing interaction in terms of controllable spatiotemporal parameters, and processing architecture 
that relates behavior to homeostatic needs via feedback. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures 
for energy efficiency have encouraged the emergence of anticipative feedforward processing 
mechanisms, and the elaboration, at the apex of the sensorimotor processing hierarchy, of self-
activating, highly attenuated recursively-feedforward circuitry processing the basic orientational 
schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking 
cognition, this recursive self-locational schema processing generates a zone of subjective self-
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awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be oneself here and now. This is 
consciousness-as-subjectivity. 
Keywords
Consciousness, theory of consciousness, self regulation, subjectivity, path integration, forward 
models, intentionality
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Introduction: The Mystery of Consciousness   
The study of consciousness has proved notoriously erratic regarding the definition of its subject 
matter. Titchener complained that the philosopher Alexander Bain, writing in the 1880's, listed no 
fewer than 13 meanings of the term (Titchener, 1915); a half century later, philosophers Gilbert 
Ryle, Alan White and John Wisdom have each offered half a dozen senses of the term 
"consciousness"--all different. In the 1980's, Thomas Natsoulas (1983) methodically analyzed six 
distinct senses of the word found in the Oxford English Dictionary, to which Ned Block has most 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      5
recently (1995) added a further four. This confusion shows itself most poignantly (and 
detrimentally) in the important consideration of the evolution of consciousness, where the initial 
emergence of recursive cognition—simple reflexive awareness—needs to be clearly distinguished 
from the subsequent development of a more elaborate "self-consciousness" involving 
metacognitive mechanisms for second-order representation of and attentional focus upon the 
organism's own mental states (or of mental states in other organisms) by means of such capacities 
as attention, short term memory, language, the ability to recognize oneself as an object (mirror 
self-recognition), and the capacity to ascribe mental states in other creatures (particularly 
conspecifics).
In consonance with the longstanding focus on subjectivity as the primary phenomenal 
characteristic of consciousness, as well as its most primitive evolutionary form (Weiskrantz, 1985; 
Farthing, 1992; Reber, 1992 ; Flanagan, 1992; Meijsing, 1997; Bermudez, 1998), consciousness as 
subjectivity will be the focus of this proposal and its explanation framed in terms of the 
evolutionary emergence of recursive processing circuitry. Using the term "self" with its 
connotation of reflexive autoreferentiality, "consciousness" will be referred to variously as 
recursive self-awareness, or consciousness-as-subjectivity or simply subjectivity. All these terms 
are intended to encapsulate Nagel's sense of consciousness-as-subjectivity wherein there is 
something it is like for that creature to be that creature (1974).
As for the more fully evolved level of conscious awareness normally ascribed at least to 
humans and some, primates, following both Baars (1992) and Reber (1992), this would be 
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understood to involve not the further development of subjectivity per se, but the addition of 
metacognitive capacities to represent one's own and other's states of mind and attentionally direct 
recursive self-awareness onto such representations in the form of introspection, abstract reasoning 
and elaborate planning and so on. Thus, though not discussed here for reasons of space, the more 
fully evolved form of consciousness should be seen not as an expanded, upgraded or changed form 
of self-consciousness, but a case of subjective self-awareness augmented by an entirely different, 
separate and independent set of cognitive mechanisms.
Phenomenal Properties of Consciousness-as-Subjectivity    
Conscious cognitive processing is consistently coherent in certain distinctive ways. Significant 
psychological features include its cyclical activation over the sleep/wake cycle, distal 
representational format, limited processing capacity, seriality and close association with short term 
memory, attention, and the detection of novelty. However, vociferous debate as to the critical 
qualities of consciousness has established a consensual recognition that no explanation of 
consciousness-as-subjectivity can be considered complete without addressing a specific set of core 
phenomenal properties. Unity, recursive processing style and egocentric perspective are among the 
features most frequently cited as basic phenomenal characteristics of consciousness (for summaries 
of phenomenal properties see Searle, 1992; Metzinger, 1995; de Sousa, 2002; Revonsuo, 2005; 
Weisberg, 2005). A fourth essential phenomenal ingredient of conscious self-awareness, the self, 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      7
calls attention to the fact that the (egocentric) first-person perspective is not expressed in the 
abstract–as merely an egocentric point of view–but is represented in concrete spatiotemporal terms 
as a distinctly-perceived self construct, which is not merely oriented spatially and temporally from 
the first-person perspective, but orientationaly situated – as a “this” (or at the more developed 
human level as “I”) situated “here” and “now” (de Sousa 2002, p. 150; Nagel, 1986, p. 61; 
Metzinger, 1995, p. 16; Revonsuo, 2005, p.133). 
Subjectivity, the distinctly recursive, referring-back-upon-itself processing regime which 
manifests phenomenally as subjective self-awareness, constitutes the central defining characteristic 
of consciousness for most analysts. Accounting for this recursive, autonoetic capacity in terms of a 
credible cognitive mechanism constitutes, arguably, the major challenge for any theory of 
consciousness. Subjectivity, in its turn, provides the functional basis for “raw feels” or qualia, the 
capacity to experience inner feelings (love, hope, fear), thoughts (plans, opinions) and unadorned 
sensory feels like the redness of a ripe tomato, the smell of gasoline or the discomfort of a pebble 
in the shoe (Block, 2007).
In the following proposal, this complex of phenomenal properties, which comprise 
consciousness-as-subjectivity, will be accounted for in terms of a tonically activated self-locating 
event schema configuring the continuous self-to-environment interaction as a single ongoing event. 
The architecture within which this egocentric event schema is continuously processed, involves 
feedback processing necessary to relate action output to homeostatic needs. This processing 
mechanism will be seen to have developed into a highly-attenuated recursive feedforward circuit as 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      8
a result of evolutionary pressures for energy-saving forms of processing (Figure 3, panels ‘b’ and 
‘c’). The tonic recursive processing of the interactive event schema supports subjective self-
awareness such that it feels like something to be oneself here and now. 
Cognitive Elements Comprising the Content of Consciousness-as-Subjectivity 
Cognition can be fruitfully understood in terms of its connection to the biological sphere (Jordan 
2008; Revonsuo, 2005), most specifically as an extension of biological self-regulation. Cognitive 
systems are to be found not in physical stuff (air, water, rocks, gas), but exclusively within 
biological organisms. This is crucial for understanding why cognition exists and what it actually 
does.  The fundamental challenge for all biological organisms is to survive by sustaining 
homeostasis–the internal conditions supporting life–in the midst of ongoing interaction with an 
ever-changing, often-threatening environment (Cannon, 1932). Cognition provides a means of 
extending the biological capacity to maintain homeostasis beyond the organism to the organism-
environment interaction by developing the capacity to control that interactivity. Cognition, then 
provides a basis not simply for self-movement, but for self-movement serving homeostatic self-
regulation (Panksepp, 1982; Cisek, 1999; Bickhard, 2008; Parvizi and Damasio, 2001).  
Cognition then, is essentially an adaptive extension of the organism’s self-regulative 
functionality into the realm of behavioral interaction. But to survive, a cognitive organism must be 
able to relate its behavior directly to its homeostatic needs (Churchland, 2002ab). Thus, cognition 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      9
is of necessity configured most basically as a control system that relates ongoing action outcomes 
to current homeostatic requirements. A cognitive organism self-regulates by controlled self-to-
environment interaction. This vital control aspect of cognition finds expression in two ways: (a) the 
central data structure or reference frame configures ongoing  interaction in a controllable form—as 
spatiotemporal self-location of the agent in relation to the environment; and (b) cognitive 
processing architecture functions as a control system relating action output to required perceptual 
inputs (and ultimately thereby to homeostatic needs). These two elements, the data structure and 
the control architecture, constitute central ingredients of the explanation of consciousness-as-
subjectivity proposed here. 
Cognition Represents  
Electrotonically-based nervous systems, on the other hand, provide several advantages over 
movement-producing molecular chains available to plants, amoeba and paramecium: (1) a capacity 
for spontaneous endogenous activation; (2) faster signal propagation; (3) signal amplification 
through spike propagation; (4) more selective activation based on sensory pattern recognition; and 
(5) a capacity to coordinate the action of multiple effectors, underwriting a capacity for more 
complex movements through multiple dendrites and axon corollaries (Mackie, 1970).  But 
arguably the biggest advantage is that nervous systems can represent, they can generate mediating 
informational states (Markman and Dietrich, 2000) that carry & display information about 
something other than itself – information about the external environment and internal bodily 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      10
homeostasis. Representation remains a somewhat controversial issue1 (reviews include Gallistel, 
2006; Markman and Dietrich, 2000; Haselager, de Groot and van Rappard, 2003). However, it is 
difficult if not impossible to adequately account for a host of cognitive functions without some 
notion of representation, particularly in the case of  hallucination, and dreaming where there is no 
external input at all (Revonsuo, 2001). 
Cognition Represents Ongoing Mobile Interaction of the Self-Moving Agent with the Environment
If cognition operates in terms of representations, what, precisely, do representations 
represent? Is the representational system a kind of Treisman Machine, involved primarily in the 
manipulation of cobbled-together surface features of objects (Treisman, 1996); or by contrast, is it 
designed to operate in terms of a portrayal of dynamic action events (Zacks and Tversky, 2001). If 
the latter, is representation configured at base in terms of the singular ongoing dynamic self-
movement event involving the organism as it interacts continuously with its environment? 
Evidence suggests that cognition provides biological organisms with the means to extend 
homeostatic self-regulation through the provision of a self-movement capacity. This means that 
cognitive systems are self-movement systems, designed to operate while moving, to represent in 
terms of interaction while on the hoof as it were (Clark, 1997), as a moving platform (Merker, 
2005). Within the embodied cognition and dynamical systems literature, the understanding that 
cognition manages interaction and does so while mobile is referred to as situated activity (Wilson, 
2002). This designed-for-motility or situated character of cognition underwrites the design of 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      11
cognitive processing in several critical dimensions. From the perspective of Evolutionary 
Psychology, perceptual systems first emerge to detect the self-movement of the agent through the 
environment (Milner and Goodale, 1998), and virtually all perceptual channels anticipatively 
adjust their output for this ongoing self-movement through the environment in order to maintain 
the stability of the egocentric perceptual display. Moreover, object recognition requires interactive 
self-movement both to develop properly (Held and Hein, 1963), and to function optimally when 
developed (Jokisch and Troje, 2003).  
Indeed the entire perceptual process is configured in terms of motile agent-to-environment 
interaction. Studies show that entities are first perceptually “individuated” as locus-of-movement 
(Spelke, 1990), and then initially identified through categorization in terms of kinds of movement 
(Csibra et al, 1999). Ensuing interpretation, in turn, focuses significantly on action potential–how 
the subject can/should interact with the object, what the object offers or affords in terms of the 
potential-for-action (Gibson, 1979). As a result, the knowledge base drawn upon in this affordance-
identification process is configured in terms of a privileged interactive “basic level” of 
categorization (Rosch, 1973) reflecting the distinctive actions we perform on particular classes of 
objects. Indeed, the entire spatiotemporal manifold in which behavioral output takes place is 
inherently meaningful to the cognitive system only by virtue of bodily interaction, the history of 
self-motion in terms of spatiotemporal parameters. Primitive meaning schemas relating to space 
(up/down, in/out, front/back, left/right, near/far), motility (momentum, source-path-goal, 
towards/away from), force (compulsion, blockage, counterforce, resistance, enablement, 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      12
attraction), and particularly temporal (then/now) and spatiotemporal schemas (fast/slow, change) 
are all action-oriented and derived from self-movement through the environment (Grush, 2000).
Most significantly, the distal “out there” representational format itself serves the agent-to-
environment interactional purpose. Events as a whole (including objects and agent) are represented 
as positioned beyond the sense organs, in a way that satisfies the needs of action control 
(Rosenberg and Anderson, 2008). And this distal format is itself further configured in terms of an 
interaction-oriented first-person perspective that involves the perspective of an agent in relation to 
the environment in which he is situated. In this sense, cognitive processes configured to facilitate 
and manage agent-to-environment interaction, can be said to be “embodied”. They arise from 
bodily interactions with the world (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) and act as “controller of embodied 
action” (Clark, 1997) or agent-to-environment interaction. 
The fact that sensory individuation, perceptual identification, the memory knowledge base 
and representational format are all configured in interactional terms, indicates not simply that 
cognition is designed to guide action but that the cognitive system is designed to operate under 
action-oriented circumstances (ongoing agent-to-environment interaction). The organization of 
motor output is similarly structured to operate in the midst of ongoing mobility. Action output is 
more or less continuous, commencing immediately upon perceptual input, and continuing in 
successive waves of adjustment and realignment as action proceeds  (Eriksen et al., 1985). 
Consequent upon this commitment to ongoing motility, interactional cognition bears the marks of 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      13
being time-pressured, of having to function under the pressures of real-time interaction (“runtime”) 
with the environment (Wilson, 2002). 
Ongoing Mobile Interaction is Represented Cognitively as One Ongoing Interaction Managed as  
Self-Location 
The fact that cognition is designed to operate as a moving platform, in terms of ongoing 
interaction, suggests that this process is configured cognitively as one singular, temporally 
extended action event. That is to say, ongoing interaction is represented not simply as a series of 
events, but in terms of its basic structure, as the same event with the same representational 
structure at every successive moment. That basic data structure can be understood as a primary 
reference frame configured in terms of a kind of “self schemata”, which in cognitive theory is 
understood  to serve as the basis both for perception and the regulation of behavior (Neisser, 1976; 
Markus & Smith, 1981 ). For purposes of managed behavior serving biological self-regulation, 
then, this foundational cognitive structure is configured in terms of the manageable spatiotemporal 
parameters of self-location of the agent in relation to the environment. This primitive self-
locational basis to the self schemata could be said then, to underlie the dictum that self-knowledge 
regulates behavior (Carver and Scheier, 1982).
Continuous self-locational computation is operationalized as spatiotemporal updating. 
Gallistel (2006) points out that direct electrophysiological observation of neural activity has shown 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      14
that the nervous system represents where the animal is and has been within the environment, how it 
is oriented in terms of both its spatial and temporal relationship to the environment (Wallentin, 
2008). That is to say, the cognitive system manages the ongoing interactional event in terms of a 
continuously updated computation of spatiotemporal self-location. In order to represent self-to-
environment interaction, cognition constructs an egocentric reference frame (Franklin and Tversky, 
1990) which is continuously and automatically updated (Riecke et al, 2007) in relation to ongoing 
self-movement through the landscape. The reference frame is self-locating because it is constituted 
by continuous updating through a combination of external sensory, as well as internal 
proprioceptive and vestibular feedback from self-movement to yield an ongoing sense where and 
when the organism is in relation to the environment (Wirth et al, 2007).  The spatial aspect of self-
locational functionality, which is computed on the basis of self-motion cues rather than with 
reference to external visual or acoustic landmarks is referred to as path integration (Etienne and 
Jeffery, 2004). The temporal aspect of self-location is referred to as scalar timing (or interval 
timing), which involves the computing of rate of motion and time spent traveling in a certain 
direction (Eagleman et al., 2005). Phylogenetically, this spatiotemporal self-locating navigational 
functionality has been identified in virtually all species of animal from humans to crustaceans. 
Because the cognitive system is designed for constant interactivity, it is designed, ipso facto, 
to constantly track this ongoing interaction. Consequently, egocentric self-locational updating in 
terms of the self-locating schema can be considered as constituting the primary ongoing reference 
frame (Hartley and Burgess, 2002; Avraamides and Sofroniou, 2006; Briscoe, 2008; Wirth et al., 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      15
2007), and as such, can be accounted, in some sense, the functional heart of the cognitive system 
(much as the more elaborate self as executive planner and decision-maker is accounted the heart of 
a self-regulating system (Carver and Sheier, 1981). 
The Primitive Self Schema Which Captures the Ongoing Self-Locational Event is Configured in  
Terms of a Single Set of Egocentric Orientational Parameters – this-here-now 
Spatiotemporal updating of ongoing interaction is consistently structured in terms of a basic self-
locating action-event schema configured in the form of spatiotemporal self-location of the causal 
agent, the self-mover in relation to the environment. The three primary parameters of interactional 
event representation, spatial, temporal and causal are configured in agent-centric terms, because 
computations designed to generate and control self-movement in relation to the environment must 
necessarily be framed in terms of the perspective of said self-movement–the first-person or 
egocentric perspective of the agent. The structural parameters of the interactive event are, then, 
causal, spatial and temporal. Casting these in the perspective of the self-moving agent: the 
egocentric depiction of the self-moving causal agent (the self-mover) at every moment is “this” 
(or, at the biographically-elaborated human level, “I”); the egocentric representation of real space, 
actual spatial location of the agent-in-relation-to-the-environment is always “here”; and the 
egocentric representation of real time, the actual temporal location of the agent-in-relation-to-the-
environment at every interactional moment is “now”. Collectively, these three egocentric 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      16
parameters structure the self-locational reference frame (and consequently the content of subjective 
space) as this-here-now. The extraction of the three critical parameters from the continuous 
processing of the ongoing interactional event to form a single, self-locational schema involves a 
process of schema-abstraction operated by the cognitive system as part of the normal process of 
memory consolidation, whereby the structure of interactive events is abstracted and retained as a 
skeletal event-schema. (Alba and Hasher, 1983). Experienced events are constantly configured 
(and consistently coherent) in terms of the egocentric self-location of the agent (Wallentin, 2008) 
within a spatiotemporal manifold of subjective presence (Metzinger, 1995; Revonsuo, 2005) 
because the configuration of events is consistently engineered (and constantly updated) in terms of 
this basic schematic spatiotemporal reference frame.
Because the three structural parameters of the self-locational schema constitute the basic 
content of consciousness-as-subjectivity, it is important to clarify precisely what they represent. As 
the this-here-now reference frame models an ongoing dynamic relational process between agent 
and environment, a relationship rather than things or objects themselves, it cannot properly be 
considered a model of the self and the environment (Edelman, 2003; Damasio, 2000;  Churchland 
and Churchland, 2002) or a representation of the self model nested in a map of the environment, as 
has also been proposed (Metzinger, 2000). Nor, lastly, should the self-locational schema be 
equated with a Melzack-like template of the body (see note 2) such as to yield an ongoing 
conscious “feel” of bodily presence in space-time (Vandervert, 1995; Jordan, 1998).2  The self-
locational schema is a tripartite data structure which functions to consistently configure the internal 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      17
representational product of self-locational event processing, and as such, it captures the 
controllable parameters of an interactional event from the perspective of the agent. In so doing, it 
does conjure up a kind of self and thus can be said to constitute a self schema. What sort of self, 
then, is this intrinsically orientational, self-located self?
The self has been described here not as a cognitive structure referencing the self alone (as 
either psychic or bodily monad), but a self engendered as part of the self-locating process, an 
ongoing, moment by moment self-locational event. This self constitutes an intrinsically situated 
self. It has been suggested that the self-schema is tripartite (this-here-now) because it comprises the 
abstracted structural parameters of the ongoing interactional event, the reference frame necessary 
to structure ongoing organism-to-environment interaction in a continuously coherent fashion. But 
there is a more substantial cause: the self arises as part of a tripartite self-locational schema 
fundamentally because the cognitive system must be able to manage the interaction in order that 
behavior can fulfill its fundamental purpose of serving homeostatic needs. 
This is the element missing in competing accounts for the origin of the self as a preconscious 
or 'core' cognitive structure (as opposed to a conscious, biographically elaborated identity). 
Opinion is divided as to the fundamental nature of the core self structure. Following Gibson 
(1979), there is continuing support for the notion that the core sense of self is inferred from the 
character of direct sensory input.3 But the self so inferred appears fundamentally vacuous, 
functionally without purpose. Others maintain that the core self represents the body (Llinas, 2001; 
Damasio, 2000; Churchland, 2002ab; Legrand, 2006; Newton, 1991; Metzinger, 1995; Vandervert, 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      18
1995). However at the neurological level, the medial fronto-posterior axis dedicated to self-related 
processing can be distinguished from the somatosensory and posterior parietal cortices which 
house specific aspects of the body image (Berlucci & Anglioti 1997). Moreover, the sense of self 
remains active in somatically deafferented subjects (Meijsing 2000), and quite distinct from the 
body sense both in cases of denial of ownership of body parts, and instances of the spatial 
transposition of the self-sense in relation to the body (Blanke & Arzy, (2005). 
Within the context of agent-to-environment interaction, social constructivist theory traces the 
emergence of the self structure specifically to social interactivity (see Stets & Burke, 2002 for 
review), to the elaboration of internal intentional states, including the distinction between self and 
virtual others, as a result of social interaction (Jordan, 2008). But while there can be little doubt 
that social interactivity constitutes a strong (perhaps even the primary) contributor to the 
development of a biographically elaborated self-concept or identity, the most primitive or basic 
interactive reference frame must articulate the self-to-environment relationship as such (as both 
physical and social), and cannot, therefore, originate in specifically social interaction. 
In this more basic, preconscious sense of interactivity, it is tempting to envisage the necessity 
of a self-other distinction as the primary and essential underpinning for the self structure (variously 
envisaged as distinguishing figure from ground (Vandervert, 1995); the need to distinguish self-
generated virtual content (thoughts) from other-generated virtual content (Prinz, 2003; Jordan, 
2008); distinguishing self action from other action (Hohwy, 2007; Boyer et al., 2005). Churchland 
has rightly observed, however, that an organism lacking the capacity to relate energy expending 
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CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      19
actions to homeostatic needs is a dead organism (2002a). Similarly a cognitive organism that 
simply distinguishes itself from the environment without the capacity to configure and thereby 
manage its interaction with that environment is likewise, a dead organism. Differentiating self from 
environment does not suffice for survival. Management of the interaction is essential.
It is this management principle which fundamentally informs the character of the "core" 
self stucture. Control of the ongoing self-to-environment interaction requires representation in 
terms of  controllable parameters, organizing perception of ongoing interactivity in terms of 
controllable spatiotemporal terms--in terms of the self-location of the organism vis a vis the 
environment as such. The self-locating event schema embodies the fact that self-regulating 
organisms have developed cognition in a form which extends that capactity for self-regulation 
through controlled self-movement, or controlled self-to-environment interaction (and this self-
regulative character of cognition extends also to the configuration of its architecture as a feedback 
system relating action to metabolic needs). 
Thus, while the cognitive system is designed to operate as an ongoing interactive platform, 
suggesting an agental core self (see Gecas, 1982 for a review), this is not the complete story. 
Ultimately, as part of a tripartite self-locating event schema, the minimal self operates to configure 
interactive experience in a way that permits self-regulation, it enables the self-sustaining metabolic 
system to self-regulate (Ghin, 2005, p. 8), and on this basis, like its architectural counterpart (the 
feedback system), the minimal self structure must be accounted essentially a self-regulatory device 
permitting managed interaction. As the abstracted foundational structure of interactional event 
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cognition, this paradigmatic self-locating event schema has become part of the innate heritage of 
the vertebrate cognitive system in much the same way as the innate domain-specific learning 
device (Carey and Spelke, 1994) and the language-acquisition device (Chomsky, 1975). Beyond 
this, its significance to cognition lies in the fact that if activated on its own within a tightly 
recursive processing architecture, this self-locational schema has the potential to manifest 
cognitively as a primitive form of subjective self-awareness (consciousness-as-subjectivity). The 
evolutionary development of just such a recursive processing circuit forms the focus of the 
following section.
 
 Evolution of the Architecture of Consciousness-as-Subjectivity
While the self-locational this-here-now schema underwrites the distinctive self-orientating content 
of consciousness, it is the autoreferential or recursive quality (or processing style) of conscious 
self-awareness (consciousness-as-subjectivity) which constitutes what most analysts consider its 
defining characteristic. Self-referencing is not an intrinsic characteristic of mental representation as 
such, and will be explained here as the consequence of a predictive processing architecture which 
develops, as a consequence of evolutionary pressure for greater energy efficiency, a recursively-
predictive circuit for processing the self-locational this-here-now schema.  The recursive 
processing architecture supporting conscious subjectivity, then, does not appear like a miracle de 
novo. It evolves from existing feedforward, and prior to that, feedback processing architectures. 
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Whence a cognitive processing architecture based initially on feedback? This question relates 
directly to what cognitive systems essentially do. The preceding section provided an extensive 
review of evidence indicating that cognition is designed to guide action, and to do so during the 
course of ongoing agent-to-environment interaction. But even more fundamentally, cognition is 
necessarily designed to guide action in relation to homeostatic needs (Churchland, 2002a). As an 
adaptive extension of the organism’s self-regulative functionality into the realm of behavioral 
interaction, the cognitive system is of necessity configured most basically as a control system 
relating ongoing action outcomes to current homeostatic requirements. This self-regulative 
character finds expression both in the central data structure or reference frame--the self-locating 
event schema--as well as in a processing architecture configured as a feedback control system (see 
Figure 1). 
But survival and reproductive success depend not only on a self-regulatory operating 
regime, but on the regime’s ability to operate in an energy efficient manner, because motor output 
is energy expensive. And biological organisms can be viewed most basically as energy regimes 
(over half the body’s weight is devoted to cellular elements that manufacture energy), so that ‘any 
organism that can capture prey, escape predators and achieve goals with a minimum demand on 
metabolic energy, has an evolutionary advantage’ (Neilson and Neilson, 2005). Thus, whatever the 
somatic and neurological changes engineered by the need to meet specific environmental 
challenges, the essential ongoing challenge is always to operate with maximum energy efficiency. 
In the evolutionary kingdom, energy is the coin of the realm, as it were, and several theorists cast 
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the critical agent-to-environment interaction specifically in these terms, such that phylogeneticly-
emergent energy-transformation regimes interact with an environment-as-energy-gradient in order 
to sustain themselves (Odum, 1988; Vandervert, 1995).  In terms of the critical relation between 
action and homeostasis, cognitive systems can thus be viewed as managers, not simply of  ongoing 
homeostatic balance, but of the energy budget available to maintain that balance through action. 
Consequently the brain is in large measure devoted to reducing the risk of energy expenditure 
through action, and recursive orientational processing that requires virtually no physical action-
output will become one of its most significant evolutionary achievements (see below).  
The evolutionary pressure for ever-greater energy-efficiency has driven elaboration at 
several functional levels of the neurocognitive system. At the molecular level, the energy cost of 
information transfer has been found to constitute a significant constraint on the number of 
signaling molecules and synapses used by neurons (Schreiber, 2002). In terms of neuronal 
interconnectivity, it has been suggested that energetic costs could limit absolute numbers of 
neurons and synaptic connections (information channels) in the brain (Laughlin, 1998). Within the 
context of the general notion of an evolutionary perceptuo-motor hierarchy in the forebrain, the 
management of self-to-environment interaction in terms of spatiotemporal self-location can be 
understood as a core function and the primary reference frame for the ongoing cognitive level 
control of perceptuo-motor processing. Most significant in this regard is the fact that evolutionary 
pressures for increased energy efficiencies have encouraged not only the emergence of successive 
levels (or tiers) of control, but also the elaborative changes in the control mechanism itself, which, 
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studies indicate, has evolved from feedback (Figure 1), to feedforward (Figure 2), and finally, 
within the spatiotemporal self-location (path integration) module, to a simplified, recursively-
feedforward circuitry (Figure 3, panels ‘b’ and ‘c’). In so doing, the hierarchical perceptuo-motor 
control system is provided with an energy-saving default state of cognitive activation in its top tier 
which does not require physical motor-output for its completion. As discussed below, it is this 
recursive processing circuit in the top tier that underwrites the state of consciousness.
Feedback Provides the Link Between Homeostasis and Self-Movement  
In the 19th century, French physiologist Claude Bernard highlighted the necessity of biological 
organisms to maintain a consistent internal physico-chemical environment (the milieu intérieur), 
which permits internal vital processes to continue functioning, independent of physicochemical 
perturbations in the external environment (Cannon, 1932). Self-movement is one means to that 
end–adopted in some form by most biological organisms (Richter, 1942-3). The earliest self-
regulatory processing mechanism that serves to maintain a tight relationship between behavioral 
motor output and internal homeostatic needs, comprises a simple negative feedback control 
mechanism (Figure 1). Within such a system, behavior is no longer simply a kneejerk reaction to 
external stimuli, but a reaction geared to the maintenance of critical internal conditions. The 
fundamental self-regulative operating principle linking motor output to homeostatic needs is 
initially embodied within cognitive functionality in the form of feedback control, which acts to 
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restore deviations from regulated internal set points through corrective external actions. In this 
way, the brain exercises control over homeostasis by using motor output to produce desired 
homeostasis-regulating inputs (Cisek, 1999).   
––––– FIGURE 1 HERE ––––––
In Figure 1, this feedback control processing architecture is illustrated in terms of a 
representation of current state (CS), which is compared to that of desired homeostatically-based 
goal state (DS) in a comparator “X”, with the disparity driving continued motor output until CS 
more closely approximates DS. Simpler versions of this architecture often omit a principled 
representation of the current state, which must be coherently represented in order to be compared 
to desired state (DS), particularly when the CS of this particular processing module is not a simple 
biological marker such as glucose level, but the current spatiotemporal self-location of the agent in 
relation to the environment. The ongoing coherence of this Current-State-of-Spatiotemporal-
Orientation representation is maintained by the continuous structuring input from a memory buffer 
(Merfeld, 2001; Bridgeman et al., 1994; Neilson and Neilson, 2005) containing the self-locating 
event schema (SL EVENT SCHEMA). As explained, the this-here-now self-locating event schema, is an 
abstracted generalization over ongoing interactive experience which serves to organize ongoing 
phenomenal experience (Current State) in terms of an extended spatiotemporal manifold, or more 
fully, in terms of a self-moving causal agent continuously located spatially and temporally within 
such a manifold. The continuous activation of this schema configures experience as 
spatiotemporally-calibrated interaction between agent and environment such that self-movement 
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can be calculated. But over time, evolutionary pressure has encouraged the exploitation of the 
potential discontinuity between orientational schema activation and the actual output of action, and 
consciousness-as-subjectivity is the result. 
 
Due to Time and Energy-Efficiency Pressures, Self-Regulative Processing Architecture Evolves from 
Feedback to Feedforward  
Cognitively endowed self-regulating biological organisms are particularly exposed to evolutionary 
pressures for energy efficiency because of the dedication of cognition to regulating homeostatic levels 
via energy-expensive motor output. Cognition essentially regulates homeostasis via action output. But 
the fact that the cognitive system has been constituted to function as a continuously moving platform 
presents two significant problems for the maintenance of homeostasis via self-movement: feedback 
processing is too slow for accurate control of a constantly-mobile cognitive organism (Churchland, 
2002a), and in addition, too costly in terms of the energy-expensive of corrective actions. To 
overcome multiple delays in sensorimotor feedback loops (Miall and Wolpert, 1996), and eliminate 
the need for further corrective movements as far as possible, fast motor control must necessarily be 
anticipative as far as possible, involving a combination of predictive (anticipative) feedforward 
models of both muscle kinematics and the perceptual outcome of movement. On the energy-expense 
front, physical activity of any kind risks depletion of scarce energy reserves with no guarantee of 
replenishment. As a means of minimizing this risk, the central self-regulatory-processing mechanism 
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has evolved from a feedback mechanism that corrects for homeostatic deviations, to feedforward 
processing that operates proactively through anticipatory actions to defend internal homeostatic 
conditions from becoming deviated. 
Feedforward processing provides increased energy efficiency in several significant ways: 
most basically, predictive adjustment to ongoing motor output saves energy through improved 
accuracy and minimization of the motor trajectory (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). Anticipation of 
(rather than feedback from) environmental change reduces the ultimate effect and thereby, the 
amount of compensatory adjustment required (Brosilow and Joseph, 2002). In the case of 
anticipated danger for example, predictive feedforward circuitry provides the facility for complete 
avoidance (Prescott, Redgrave and Gurney, 1998). The capacity, in feedforward architecture, to 
represent the expected results of upcoming actions provides the basis for replacing aimless 
wandering with proactive, goal-focused foraging (Glasauer, 1992), as well as the anticipatory 
orientation of attention toward stimuli which are relevant for action in general (Mehta and Schaal, 
2002). In addition, feedforward representation provides the capacity to completely replace energy-
expensive external trial-and-error activity with internal mental planning (Mandler, 2002). Finally, 
feedforward goal representation supports not just trajectory minimization, but action minimization, 
the replacement of attack with threat (of attack), of extended bodily movement with gesture as the 
initial basis of communication. 
The net result of these avenues to improved energy efficiency is a cognitive system capable 
of anticipatively self-regulating for homeostasis by means of feedforward processing mechanisms. 
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The universality of this anticipatory feedforward architecture is reflected at several levels, 
including sensory processing (Glasauer, 1992), attention (Mehta and Schaal, 2002), motor control 
(Miall & Wolpert, 1996), including  anticipatory postural adjustment for upcoming self-movement, 
and mental imagery (Kosslyn and Sussman, 1994). Consequently, several theories of cognition 
have been proposed (Cotterill, 1998; Hesslow, 2002; Barsalou, 1999; Grush, 2004; Jordan, 1998; 
Vandervert, 1995), based on the notion that cognitive representation is essentially engaging in 
simulated interaction with the environment by means of internal predictive internal models. 
Most significantly, as regards the central claim of the theory outlined here, the dedication of 
cognitive architecture to an anticipative feedforward processing format (for speed and energy 
efficiency) implies that the recursive circuitry required to underwrite conscious subjectivity is most 
likely to have evolved out of such predictive cognitive architecture. Specifically, this theory 
proposes that evolutionary pressures for ever more energy-efficient sensory-motor processing has 
encouraged the progressive attenuation of feedforward processing circuitry into a simplified 
recursive feedforward circuit capable of underwriting autoreferential conscious self-awareness. 
The architecture customarily used to model predictive feedforward processing casts the 
perceptuo-motor control system as a Markov processor whereby the current states of a process lead to 
its own future states when current motor commands exert their effect. These future states, in turn, 
update the current state (Grush, 2004, sec 2.1). Markov process models explain the mechanical 
operations involved in guiding the transition of present state into the next present state. These 
anticipatory processing mechanisms use predictive or “forward” perceptual models of what the future 
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state will be (if we go ahead and execute this action) as a way of guiding the transition from present 
moment to next present moment. Specifically, anticipatory self-regulatory-processing  architecture (as 
illustrated in Figure 2) utilizes four internal models to represent the various elements of the predictive 
Markhov control system: models for the desired state (DS), the actual current state (CS), the predicted 
future state (forward model FM) and a structuring schema which acts to configure both CS and FM 
into a consistent event representation–the self-locating event schema (SL EVENT SCHEMA) abstracted 
from the ongoing agent-to-environment interaction. 
–––––––––– FIGURE 2 HERE ––––––––––
Within the feedforward control circuit (as with negative feedback loop), the desired 
homeostatic state (DS) is constantly compared (“X”) with the actual current state (CS), and actions 
are generated on the basis of the difference between the two. But action generation necessary to 
close the gap between DS and CS is not random trial and error. The system makes use of an 
Inverse Controller (or inverse model) to provide motor commands specifically tailored to achieve a 
desired sensory outcome state. When connected to a memory system that stores sensory-input to 
motor-output conjunctions, the Inverse Controller is capable of retrieving motor output likely to 
produce required sensory inputs (Held, 1968), of taking as input a perceptual representation of the 
required adjustment and producing as output the motor movement that will result in perceptual 
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feedback incorporating that adjustment so that Current State (CS) becomes more closely aligned 
with Desired State (DS). The Inverse Controller, in other words, translates the desired perceptually-
represented goal of a movement into the set of actions (a motor command) needed to achieve that 
movement (Neilson and Neilson, 2005). 
The Inverse Controller also produces a copy of its motor command (corollary discharge, 
efference copy) which provides the basis for a predictive or “forward” model (FM) of the expected 
perceptual result of that action. The forward model, in other words, uses efference copy of the 
motor command to predict the sensory consequences of those commands whenever movements are 
made (Miall and Wolpert, 1996). The forward model is able to feed into a DS comparator (“X”) 
and anticipatively adjust ongoing action; at the same time, the forward model predictively updates 
CS in advance of feedback from actual motor output. There are thus three processing loops in this 
system: two fast internal feedforward loops from Inverse Controller to Forward Model which then 
(1) updates Current State as well as (2) feeding forward into a DS comparator to effect correction 
to motor output on the run. A third time-delayed loop (3) proceeds from the Inverse Comparator to 
motor output and feeds back to CS via the sensory systems. 
The current state (CS) is the central representation in this control system because it is the end 
result that is being controlled for (or more correctly, its proximity to DS is being controlled for). 
Current State (CS) is constituted by three inputs: (1) continuous feedforward updating from the 
Forward Model; (2) periodic feedback from the sensory systems (as gated by expected feedback 
represented by the FM); and finally (3), CS is consistently structured as the representation of an 
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interaction event by the structuring input from a memory buffer (Merfeld, 2001; Bridgeman et al., 
1994; Neilson and Neilson, 2005) consisting of the self-locating event schema (SL EVENT SCHEMA). 
Based on brain imaging studies consistently identifying the posteromedial cortex as the neural 
source for conscious cognition (Laureys, 2004), and the direct innervation of this area by the 
wake/sleep arousal system sourced from the postero-lateral hypothalamus via the basal forebrain 
(Saper, Scammell and Lu, 2005), it is postulated that this structure-providing SL EVENT SCHEMA 
memory buffer is independently activated by the sleep/wake innervation system, thus providing a 
self-activating base to the interactional configuration of waking experience. 
The functional independence, as it were, of the SL EVENT SCHEMA feed is of particular 
importance, given that CS is a computation of spatiotemporal self-location updated moment to 
moment from self-movement feedback (as well as anticipatory FM of expected feedback). Without 
the initial structural input from the SL EVENT SCHEMA feed, CS would be utterly dependent on 
continuous movement for its activation. As the primary reference frame of the cognitive system, 
this would, in effect, hold the entire cognitive economy hostage to ongoing movement, both large 
limb ambulatory movement and tonic postural adjustment. The SL EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer is 
relatively independent of sensory feedback for its activation, and as a result of continuous 
evolutionary pressure to reduce energy-expensive physical activity to a minimum, it is encouraged 
to become more so, to sustain its activity through self cueing. Self-activation of ES accounts for the 
twin facts that (a) orientative self-locating spatial updating is automatic and continuous (Rieke et 
al., 2007), and (b) that self-location is still operative in deafferented individuals where there is no 
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active sensory feedback from self movement (Meijsing, 2000). Additional evidence for the 
independent self-activation of ES can be gleaned from phenomena such as change blindness 
(Grimes, 1996), which indicates that the cognitive system does not depend on external feedback to 
maintain a consistently activated, self-located perceptual state. The driver for this continuity must 
be top-down, originating in its self-activated structural matrix, the SL EVENT SCHEMA. 
Self-Regulative Processing Evolves from Feedforward to Recursively Feedforward  
As noted in our initial treatment of the explanadum, it is the phenomenal properties of conscious 
self-awareness that need to be explained, and primary amongst these, the self-referring or recursive 
quality of subjective self-awareness, which underwrites the feelings and sensations of qualia. 
Several existing explanations of phenomenal subjectivity refer to psychological processing 
mechanisms which are not, in themselves, recursive in nature, such as Daniel Dennett’s multiple 
drafts (a series of static updates), or secondary processing theories such as higher-order thought 
(Dretske, 1993), attentional highlighting of representational content (Crick, 1984), linguistic 
coding (Edelman, 1989) or global accessibility (Dennett, 2001; Baars, 1988), where the additional 
processing of a perceptual representation somehow confers qualia-like status upon it. But in each 
case, the process doing the consciousness-conferring work does not employ autoreferential 
processing circuitry and is not itself self-consciously aware. A more credible candidate for the 
generation of autoreferential self-awareness (consciousness-as-subjectivity) would be a self-
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referring cognitive mechanism, a processing circuit which is itself recursive, continuously and 
anticipatively feeding forward into or ‘referring to’ or ‘recognizing’ itself. This is the solution 
proposed here. In a nutshell, everything currently known about he evolution of cognition points to 
a consistent increase in attenuated processing of existing circuitry as a more energy-efficient way 
of maintaining homeostatic self-regulation through self-movement. Attenuation of feedforward 
circuitry (Figure 2) leads to fully recursive feedforward circuitry (Figure 3).
Attentuation plays a major role in the metamorphosis of the self-locational updating module 
from a merely anticipatory feedforward mechanism to a recursively-feedforward processor. For 
cognitive organisms, where cognition is essentially designed to maintain homeostasis through self-
movement, the drive toward improved energy efficiency necessarily involves both brain and body 
operating efficiencies. In both instances, attenuation constitutes a common theme. When 
somatically active, all movements are constructed on a minimum-trajectory basis which is 
managed by last-minute, only-as-much-as needed adjustments (Todorov, 2004). Periods of 
behavioral torpor (sleep, hibernation) can be seen as a way of limiting active self-to-environment 
interaction to only the most energy-rewarding periods. Proactive foraging that deploys top-down 
feedforward circuitry to focus activity on specific targets is, again, a form of attenuated activity. 
And the development of communication from bodily gesture can also be seen as embodying this 
tendency toward attenuated somatic activation. Undoubtedly, the most extreme form of behavioral 
attenuation is exhibited in surviving species of primitive tunicates which abandon both somatic 
(tail, tail musculature) and cognitive (brain, nervous system) capacity for motility altogether. 
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Surviving forms develop a gut, gills and brachial structures which are present but no longer 
operative (Llinas, 2001), indicating that these creatures have regressed from what was once a more 
actively-motile life, to a highly-attenuated 1-day excursion to find a suitable substrate to attach 
itself before resuming a permanently sessile existence. 
Attenuation is particularly critical for cognitive processing, because the brain, unlike the 
body, expends most of its energy on active information processing, not metabolism. Where the 
soma devotes 70% of its energy budget to ongoing metabolism and the balance to behavioral 
activity (posture, locomotion, mating), cognitive costs are the reverse. The brain expends 80% of 
its energy on information processing as opposed to purely metabolic  activity (Attwell and 
Laughlin, 2001). Thus, the achievement of energy economies in the way information is processed 
have a significant impact on the overall energy expenditure (Attwell and Laughlin, 2001) and the 
cognitive economy, as a result, is replete with cost effective information-processing mechanisms 
such as sparse coding (Churchland, Ramachandran and Sejnowski, 1994) and minimal updating of 
scene (Rensink, 2000), schema abstraction for memory storage (Hess and Flannagan, 1992), and 
attentional limitation (Mack and Rock, 1998). Attenuation of the feedforward processing 
architecture leads to the development of recursive processing circuitry.  
This evolutionary attenuation is facilitated by the hierarchical organization of sensorimotor 
functionality. Introduced by Hughlings Jackson (1884/1958), the hierarchical understanding of the 
neurocognitive system, in which the brain is seen as implementing multiple levels of sensorimotor 
competence, has been supported by anatomical, physiological and behavioral research (Prescott, 
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Redgrave and Gurney, 1998). Both sensory input feeds and motor output are arranged in a 
hierarchy of successively more complex processing channels, and behavior itself can be 
decomposed into successively simpler units as levels of the neuraxis are surgically removed. 
Included within this sensorimotor hierarchy, orientational mechanisms (spatial updating and path 
integration) have been located at several levels of the neuraxis, including the cortex, mammalian 
hippocampus and brainstem superior colliculus. This hierarchical layering of sensorimotor 
functionality, including self-orientative processing, allows for the evolutionary attenuation of 
circuity at the most senior level of the hierarchy toward the simplified, fully recursive circuitry that 
generates consciousness as subjectivity, leaving lower levels unchanged, where they continue to 
function in an unconscious mode.
Understood in terms of the ongoing interactive event, which consists of an initial self-
locational calibration (this-here-now) followed by action output, attenuation of the senior level of 
sensorimotor processing proceeds on three fronts: (a) an extension of the initial orientative phase 
of interactional processing while minimizing the subsequent physical action component; (b) the 
development an extremely truncated feedforward processing circuit within the orientational phase 
itself, facilitated by decreasing dependence on feedback from self-movement as major driver of the 
circuitry, and an increased capacity to complete its feedforward processing loop internally; and (c), 
decreased input from movement-related external feedback and internal feedforward content, allows 
the two principal data structures (CS and FM) to consist increasingly of the structural input of the 
orientational self schema (Figure 3, panel 'b') . This attenuated circuitry consists eventually, at the 
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seniormost level, of the orientational schema feeding forward immediately into itself, independent 
of additional representational feedback from self-movement (panel 'c'). This recursive self-
conversation, as it were, constitutes the rudiments of subjectivity, so that the recursive processing 
underwriting conscious subjectivity emerges, in effect, from the increased evolutionary fitness 
derived from the capacity to remain cognitively alert while physically inert, exchanging energy 
expensive physical activity for low-cost pre-physical orientative processing. Thus, the primary (but 
certainly not the sole) adaptive value of recursive conscious processing is energy efficiency. 
Figure 3 illustrates the specifics of this evolutionary development from feedforward to 
recursively feeedforward processing circuitry. Here, CS constitutes the final representative product
—the current state—of the self-locational feedforward processing architecture. It is normally 
understood that continuous spatiotemporal updating involved in this process is driven largely by 
external sensory and internal proprioceptive feedback from self-movement. But given the 
hierarchical character of orientational processing consisting of a series of such feedback 
calculations, it is possible for the top tier of the processing circuitry to evolve away from absolute 
dependence on feedback from physical self-movement without the entire motor control hierarchy 
grinding to a halt. Evolution encourages development in this direction because it produces 
cognitive circuitry that can remain activated without reliance on actual energy-expensive physical 
movement. Organisms than can remain cognitively alert while minimally active at the physical 
level have increased fitness. 
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––––––––––––– FIGURE 3 HERE –––––––––––
Increased reliance of the self-locational processor on internal drivers for continuous 
activation begins, as we have noted above, with the self-cueing EVENT SCHEMA that provides the 
basic structure of first the CS and eventually both CS and FM representations. Continued 
evolutionary pressure for increased energy efficiency then, encourages further development in the 
familiar form of attenuated processing. In the particular case of self-locational updating, this 
consists of decreased reliance on feedback from external physical self-movement (shown in Figure 
3 as a change from heavy to light connectivity in the external loop) along with increased emphasis 
on the internal processing circuit comprised of the reciprocal CS-FM circuit. Decreased external 
self-movement also means that both CS and FM can be envisaged as consisting to an ever-greater 
extent of the structural input from the SL EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer. As it does so, the CS-FM 
circuit is able to become ever more tightly interlocked because more completely based on its own 
arousal feed for self-activation, and less dependent upon the DS comparators as drivers. 
Essentially, this enables the self-locational calculation to complete its cycle within the CS-FM 
circuit alone. CS drives FM, and FM drives CS where each, eventually consists solely of the 3-
parameter SL EVENT SCHEMA. 
This highly attenuated positive feedback loop is now completely recursive, and driven by a 
self-activating memory buffer which is directly linked to the wake-sleep cycle of its principal 
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arousal feed sourced in the lateral hypothalamus.  The recursively-processed content consists 
essentially of the same SL EVENT SCHEMA represented as current this-here-now state (CS) and the 
expected next current this-here-now state (FM).4 The CS-FM circuit has emerged as a stand-alone 
recursive working memory loop or reverberatory circuit consisting of the this-here-now Event 
Schema referring continuously back upon itself. Because it is self-activating and thus tonically 
sustainable as well as supremely energy efficient, this new form of self-locational alertness 
becomes the default processing state of active cognition; a default state of recursive this–here-now 
schema processing which manifests at the phenomenal level as subjectivity, conscious self-
awareness.
Consciousness-as-subjectivity, therefore, can be considered the by-product of incessant 
evolutionary pressure on cognitive organisms for greater energy efficiency, pressure that has 
driven the existing self-regulatory FC architecture toward greater attenuation via a more tightly 
recursive format involving the CS-FM-CS working memory loop such that the orientational 
schema phasing between an immediate present (CS) and immediate future (FM) as itself, is 
simultaneously anticipating and recognizing itself, or tonically monitoring itself in the form of i-
here-now. 
In terms of Nagel’s sense of subjectivity wherein there is always “something it is like to be 
that organism, something for that organism (Nagel, 1974); that “something it is like to be” is 
everywhere and always primarily what it is like for that organism to be an this-here-now.  The 
recursive this-here-now is always what subjectivity is like. As outlined in the first section of this 
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proposal, subjectivity consists in experiencing oneself as here and now at every moment in every 
circumstance. This being oneself here and now has an immediacy which, even at the level of a 
primitively subjective creature would manifest as both agency (this is (or "I am") performing this  
act) and ownership (this body is part of me) such that before initiating any intellectual operations 
or discursive thought (in the case of humans), or without any metacognitive processing in a 
primitively subjective creature, I am already “directly” acquainted with the contents of my self-
consciousness. Self recognition entails self-discernment: I always know which one is me, which 
one I am (even without the additional metacognitive capacity to reflect upon that fact) as distinct 
from the landscape and other conspecifics. Even at a primitive level of conscious subjectivity then, 
a creature with self-awareness would never be unfamiliar with itself, never surprised by its own 
presence, and would experience itself as being identical through time (although, again, without the 
capacity for metacognitive representation of its own states, it would not actively notice or reflect 
upon this continuity). A creature with subjectivity experiences its body parts as part of itself, and 
experiences its acts as initiated and performed by itself.
At the phenomenal level, consciousness-as-subjectivity arises as a singular unified field of 
self-awareness because underwritten by a single schema, processed continuously in an 
autoreferential or recursive style where “self” is always experienced, subjectively, as an “this” 
explicitly located “here” and “now”. This recursive this-here-now processing provides the basis of 
subjective self-awareness, of what it feels like to be oneself here and now. Consciousness is 
essentially subjectively-experienced spatiotemporal self-location.
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Conclusion 
Consciousness bears the self-locational content that it does because orientation grounds the 
behavioral output of any self-moving cognitive platform and provides the crucial parameters by 
which behavior can be controlled. Framed in the egocentric perspective of that self-moving 
platform, the structural parameters (spatial, temporal and causal) of the ongoing, constantly-
updated orientational event are abstracted  and fused into a single schema, the activation of which 
provides the basic reference frame for ongoing cognitive experience.  Based on the principle of 
neuropsychological identity, consciousness-as-subjectivity manifests as a unified singularity 
because it is the recursive processing of this single self-same schema.5  Based on that same 
principle, the autoreferential character of conscious cognition can be said to arise directly in 
consequence of the recursive style in which the self-locating orientational schema is processed, a 
form of tightly self-referring circuitry which derives from attenuative evolution of feedforward 
architecture into recursively feedforward processing regime. 
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Footnotes
1. Not least amongst these issues would be the largely unresolved question as to the precise 
neurological underpinings of representational content. As long as the relationship between 
the underlying neuro-physical processes and symbolic (representational) properties remains 
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obscure, the notion of mental representation cannot be said to constitute a fully established 
explanatory primitive, although the principal of neuropsychological identity remains in 
effect. At the philosophical level, much attention has been directed to the related question 
regarding the necessary connection between cognitive (representational) experience and 
brain functionality. Philosophers have argued that because cognitive "zombies" (creatures 
possessing the requisite brain functionality without being consciously self-aware) are 
logically possible (Kirk, 1974; Chalmers, 1996), then it cannot be claimed that recursive 
self-awareness necessarily accompanies recursive brain functionality. But as Flanagan & 
Polger point out (1995, p.3; cf Churchland, 2002a: pp. 176-8; Heil, 2003: p. 229; Cottrell, 
1999) and even Chalmers himself admits (1996, p.269), the credibility of this kind of 
argument, based as it is on the evidentiary force of logic alone, holds only outside a 
naturalistic framework. Within the naturalistic framework of empirical neurospsychology 
adopted in this proposal (see Evolution of The Architecture of Consciousness below), all 
properties and processes are understood to be natural properties and processes explainable 
in terms of naturalistic laws (physics, chemistry, biology), such that cognitive properties 
accompany neurological characteristics as part of a neuropsychological identity, and the 
evolutionary context of all biological phenomena (including cellular signalling in the form 
of nervous systems) is understood to answer to biological, chemical and physical but not 
logical imperatives. Logic in and of itself has no evidentiary force whatsoever within a 
naturalistic framework– things are not so simply and solely because it can be argued 
philosophically that it follows, logically, that they should be so, or that they can be 
imagined to be so. Empirical evidence determines facts. Consequently, the zombie 
argument simply has no legitimacy and should never have been introduced.
2. A sophisticated theory of consciousness has been developed by Vandervert (1995) and 
Jordan (1998) construing consciousness as the ongoing activation of an internal body 
template (which they derive from Ronald Melzack's notion of a phantom limb sensation) 
yielding the conscious “feel” of bodily presence in space-time, including self ownership 
and location. This continuously generated feedforward template of the body in space-time 
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(Vandervert 1995, p.113) is said to be generated by a primitive self-other discrimination 
comparator (Jordan, 1998, p. 168). With its emphasis on space-time self presence and 
anticipatory processing (see note 4 below), the Vandervert-Jordan theory resembles the 
explanation of consciousness as recursive, spatiotemporal self-location outlined here. It 
should be noted, however, that the theories differ significantly in regard to (1) the data 
structure (body template vs self-location template), (2) the processing mechanism (self-
other comparator/self-location),and (3) the fact that, in concert with Revonsuo (2005), the 
Vandervert-Jordan theory assumes that spatiotemporal processing is conscious in and of 
itself, while the self-locational theory insists that consciousness-as-subjectivity requires the 
evolution of recursive anticipative processing circuitry.
3. Gibson (1979; cf. Neisser, 1988; Bermudez, 1998) insists that information about the self is 
directly perceived in the form of the boundedness of the field of vision as well as the 
occlusion of portions of the visual field by parts of the body such as the nose and hands.  
4. The idea that consciousness consists of the merger of the immediate present with the 
immediate future can also be found in the philosophical explanation of the phenomenal 
present moment as a blend of past, present and future. Natika Newton and Ralph Ellis 
contend that the ‘temporal thickness’ of conscious awareness derives from a weaving 
together of new sensory input with the memory of immediate past input, along with 
anticipations (expectations) of immediate future input. (Newton, 2001). Within the 
cognitive science field, several authors have indicated that anticipative internal simulation 
in the form of forward models will in some unspecified way be found to support 
conciousness (Haggard, 2005; Hesslow, 2002; Cleermans, 2005; Fourneret et al., 2002). 
Taylor has argued for a notion of consciousness as anticipatory attention (2002). A strong 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
do
i:1
0.
10
38
/n
pr
e.
20
09
.2
44
4.
2 
: P
os
te
d 
20
 O
ct
 2
00
9
CONSCIOUSNESS AS SELF-LOCATION      54
case for the anticipatory character of consciousness has also been developed by Vandervert, 
Hershberger and Jordan. In his original proposal regarding consciousness as “the 
experience of the body-in-space-time,Vandervert referred to the feedforward character of 
the processing.  Hershberger-Jordan have further emphasized the anticipatory nature of the 
perceived body-in-space-time template which encodes the coordinates and generates a 
perception of the body in space-time, by styling it an “extrabody signal” (Jordan 1998:167) 
generated in the same way as the anticipatively perceived extra-retinal signal of upcoming 
eye position—the “Phantom Array” (Hershberger, 1997; Jordan, 1998). 
5. Mandler (2002, p. 45) points out that ‘experiences are seamless and unitary to the extent 
that they activate existing schemas’.
Figure 1: Feedback Control Circuit – Simple Feedback 
control circuit that works to align actual current sate with desired 
(homeostatic) state. LEGE N D:  CS  = Current State; DS  = Desired 
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
Figure 2: Feedforward FM to CS with Self­Cueing SL Event 
Schema for greater energy efficiency via improved accuracy of move ment 
trajectory. The  INVER S E  CO N T R O L L E R  takes as input the current state (CS) of 
a system  as compared  to the desired state (DS) and produces as output 
the action required to eliminate disparity (outer loop), as well as corollary 
output consisting of a motor com mand  which is then further transformed  into 
prediction as to the next perceptual state (FM) of the system  (inner 
loop).  FM  takes as input SC  + IC motor com m and  copy.  CS  takes as input 
EVE N T  SCH E M A  parameters, the FM  of upcoming  self­move ment,  and external 
sensory feedback from  self­movement.  DS  takes as input homeostatic needs. 
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Figure 3: Evolution of Recursive SL Event Schema Circuit  Panel A  is 
essentailly the same  as in the previous figure. Panel B  shows  the circuit consisting of DS­CS  
comparator and  DS­FM  comparator diminishing in importance, as does Inverse Controller to FM; 
while the CS­FM  reciprocal connectivity strengthens.  Also, the this­here­now Event Schema  
(“SL Event Schema”) constitutes an ever­greater proportion of both CS  and  FM. In Panel C, CS  
Event Schema  and  FM  Event Schema  essentially feed forward into each other, constituting a self­
activated, recursive, working me m ory  circuit. 
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Figure 3
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